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We propose a quantum key distribution protocol based on a quantum retrodiction protocol, known
as the Mean King problem. The protocol uses a two way quantum channel. We show security
against coherent attacks in a transmission error free scenario, even if Eve is allowed to attack both
transmissions. This establishes a connection between retrodiction and key distribution.
INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (qkd) protocols allow two
parties, traditionally called Alice and Bob, to generate a
secret key, which enables them to communicate secretly
via onetime pad encryption. There are qkd protocols,
that guarantee the security of the key against an eaves-
dropper, who is capable of implementing arbitrary quan-
tum operations (coherent attacks) [1, 2, 3].
After the execution of a qkd protocol Alice and Bob
should share an identical and random bit string, which is
unknown to a potential eavesdropper Eve. If one forgets
for a moment about the secrecy of the bit string, the goal
in a qkd protocol is that one of the communicating part-
ners infers a bit value corresponding to a measurement
outcome obtained or a state prepared by the other. In an
optimal protocol one would request that this is possible
in every run of the protocol.
A similar problem has been proposed by Vaidman,
Aharonov and Albert in the context of the retrodiction
of a measurement result of a spin 12 -particle, known as
the Mean King problem [4]. Alice in this setting has to
guess the outcome of a measurement performed by Bob
without knowing the measurement bases used. There has
been a first proposal to use this setup in a quantum cryp-
tographic context in [6], but a security proof accounting
for an arbitrary attack on both quantum channels was
not given. In this paper we show, that there are solutions
to the Mean King problem, which guarantee the security
of these measurement results against an eavesdropper in
a stronger scenario, thus establishing the connection be-
tween retrodiction and security. In addition the proposed
protocol generates a bit of raw key in every single run.
SETTING AND RESULT
The Mean King retrodiction problem
The retrodiction problem can be stated as a quan-
tum game played by two players. One player, Alice,
wins the game if she can guess a measurement outcome
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obtained by the other player, Bob. Beforehand both
of them agree on a Hilbert space H of dimension d
and a set of d + 1 orthonormal bases of this Hilbert
space {Φb(i); i = 1, . . . , d, b = 1, . . . , d+ 1}. Here Φb(i)
denotes the i-th basis vector of the b-th basis.
Alice starts the game by preparing a maximally entan-
gled state Ω ∈ H ⊗H and sends the second system to
Bob. He performs a projective measurement in a ran-
domly chosen basis b ∈ {1, . . . , d + 1}, but keeps this
choice and his measurement result i secret. After Bob
has returned the resulting eigenstate of his measurement
to Alice, she holds the state (conditional on Bob obtain-
ing i)
Φˆb(i) = (1⊗ |Φb(i)〉〈Φb(i)|)Ω. (1)
After Alice has performed a final measurement {Fx} on
this state, obtaining a classical result x, all quantum in-
formation is discarded. In the last step Bob reveals his
choice of basis b and depending on this value and her
measurement result x, Alice has to guess Bob's measure-
ment outcome i. We note that the precise form of the
result x is not important and we might think of it as a
d + 1-tupel x = (x(1), . . . , x(d+ 1)) indicating to Alice
that she should guess i = x(b) if the basis b was cho-
sen by Bob. We refer to x as a guessing function. As
there are d different possible measurement outcomes for
each of the d + 1 measurement bases, the set X of pos-
sible guessing functions has dd+1 different elements. A
successful strategy for Alice consists of a maximally en-
tangled state Ω and a measurement {Fx} such that the
probability for a wrong guess is zero, which means that
tr(Fx|Φˆb(i)〉〈Φˆb(i)|) = 0, unless x(b) = i and that she can
make a guess in every round, implying the normalization
condition
∑
Fx = 1.
The existence of such a strategy has been studied in
the case of mutually unbiased bases (MUBs) [4, 5]. In [7]
it has been shown, that for constructing a winning strat-
egy weaker conditions are sufficient. A set of k bases only
has to be non-degenerate meaning that the span of the
projectors |Φb(i)〉〈Φb(i)| is k(d− 1) + 1 dimensional and
has to admit a classical model. Here a set of k bases is
said to admit a classical model, if there exists a probabil-
ity distribution of k variables, each taking d values, such
that its marginals equal the probability distributions of
the joint probabilities pab(i, j) = 1d |〈Φb(i)|Φa(j)〉|2 for all
pairs of bases.
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2In our scenario with k = d+1, non-degeneracy implies
also that the projectors span the space of all hermitian
operators on H . Of course, d+ 1 mutual unbiased bases
(MUBs) are an example of a set of bases exhibiting this
properties [7].
The qkd protocol
We assume a setting for the Mean King problem, in
which the set of bases is non-degenerate and Alice has
a successful strategy, that is maximal in the sense of in-
corporated measurement projectors (see bellow). In each
run, there will be n instances of the Mean King problem,
and we use a vector arrow to indicate n-tuples of choices
outcomes, etc. It is irrelevant for our analysis, whether
the steps are carried out sequentially for each instance,
or for the full block of n instances simultaneously.
1. Initially, an entangled state ρn of n pairs is gener-
ated and distributed to Alice and Bob. This pro-
cess is vulnerable to attack, but they proceed as if
ρn = |Ω⊗n〉〈Ω⊗n| consists of n copies of the pure
state used for the Mean king problem.
2. Bob chooses at random n measurement bases ~b,
performs the projective measurement with basis bk
on the kth particle, obtaining the results ik, and
sends back the corresponding eigenstate. Alto-
gether he returns Φ~i(~b) =
⊗n
k=1 Φik(bk), without
disclosing ~i or ~b.
3. Alice performs her measurement {Fx} on each of
the returning particles and the corresponding one
in her storage, obtaining as a result an n-tuple ~x of
guessing functions.
4. After Alice announces that she finished the last of
her measurements Bob publishes his choice of bases
~b from which Alice infers i′k = xk(bk).
Since this is a Mean King game between Alice and Bob,
without Eve's interaction this will produce an identical
string ~i′ =~i of d-digits. In order to test for the presence
of an eavesdropper, Alice and Bob will randomly select
some particles k and check for the agreement i′k = ik in
these instances, and accept, if they never find a deviation.
Security
The transmission error free scenario for the security
analysis assumes that Alice and Bob do find agreement
with probability 1, i.e., that a potential attacker does not
risk the introduction of any errors at all, and also that
there are no spontaneous transmission errors. Of course,
a full analysis would have to allow for errors, so the proof
of security in this scenario is only a proof of principle.
In our setting, Eve can interact at different stages.
First she may provide the initial state, possibly keep-
ing a system of her own entangled with the distributed
pairs. Then she may interact with the states that Bob
returns to Alice in a coherent way and finally making
a joint measurement on her system. Since we analyse
whole blocks simultaneously, we even allow choices vio-
lating time ordering.
What we show in the next section is that if Eve's ac-
tions do not interfere with the perfect key agreement,
which Alice and Bob can test in principle, then her fi-
nal conclusion will be uncorrelated with the key, i.e., she
will have learned nothing about it.
PROOF
A key notion in the Mean King problem is the idea
of safe vectors [7]. All vectors in the range of a mea-
surement operator Fx must be safe vectors, if Alice does
not want to risk a wrong guess. Together with a conve-
nient normalization, we call ηx a safe vector for guessing
function x if
〈ηx |Φˆb(i)〉 = δx(b),i ∀ (2)
with Φˆb(i) from Eq. (1). It is shown in [7] that for a non-
degenerate choice of bases such a vector exists for every
guessing function x.
If Alice chooses a measurement {Fx} that incorporates
all of the projectors p(x)|ηx 〉〈ηx|, p(x) 6= 0 we will call
her strategy maximal. We will now show, that an opera-
tor, that possesses all the ηx as eigenvectors has to be a
multiple of the identity.
Lemma 1. Let H be a Hilbert space of dimension d
and {Φb(i)} a set of d+ 1 non-degenerate ONBs and let
Alice have a maximal successful strategy. If an operator
E : H ⊗ H → H ⊗ H fulfills Eηx = exηx for all
safe vectors ηx solving (2), then ex ≡ e is constant and
E = e1.
Proof. At first from
∑
x p(x)|ηx 〉〈ηx| = 1 we can con-
clude that spanR{ηx; x ∈ X} = H ⊗H holds. Since
the number of dd+1 guessing functions is larger than the
maximal dimension d2 of H ⊗ H and there is a safe
vector ηx for every guessing function [7], we can ask for
a decomposition of a given safe vector ηx in a set of lin-
early independent safe vectors {ηy}, with ηx 6= ηy and
ηx =
∑
y αyηy, such that αy 6= 0, ∀y. One possibility is
to choose the three safe vectors ηu, ηv, ηw, whose guessing
functions fulfill for two bases b′, b˜ ∈ {1, . . . , d+ 1}, b′ 6= b˜
the relations
x(b′) = v(b′) = i′ 6= j′ = u(b′) = w(b′)
x(b˜) = u(b˜) = i˜ 6= j˜ = v(b˜) = w(b˜)
x(b) = u(b) = v(b) = w(b), b /∈ {b˜, b′}.
3Then the decomposition is given by ηx = ηu + ηv − ηw,
which can be seen by evaluating the defining equation
2 for all cases. If ηx, ηu, ηv, ηw are eigenvectors of the
operator E, it follows from the uniqueness of the decom-
position in linearly independent vectors and
Eηx = E(ηu + ηv − ηw) = euηu + evηv − ewηw (3)
Eηx = ex(ηu + ηv − ηw) (4)
that ηu, ηv, ηw belong to the same eigenvalue.
Now pick two arbitrary safe vectors ηx, ηy with x 6= y,
which by the assumptions belong to the eigenvalues ex
and ey. Since x 6= y there exist 1 6 m 6 d + 1 bases
bk with x(b) 6= y(b). Now choose a sequence of guessing
functions (zl)ml=0 with z0(b) = x(b) ∀b and zl+1(b) = zl(b)
∀b 6= bl+1 and zl+1(bl+1) = y(bl+1) which accounts for
zm(b) = y(b). With the paragraph above it follows, that
ezl = ezl+q for all l and therefore especially ex = e for all
guessing functions x since x and y were arbitrary.
Using that span {ηx} = H ⊗H holds, we can find for
all Ψ ∈H ⊗H a set of linearly independent {ηx} such
that Ψ =
∑
x αxηx with αx 6= 0 ∀x. This shows that
every Ψ ∈ H ⊗H is an eigenvector of E and we can
conclude that E = e1.
The key to showing security for blocks of length n is
to consider these n steps as part of a single instance of
a Mean King retrodiction game in a larger Hilbert space
with more bases. By tensoring we get (d+ 1)n measure-
ment bases {Φ~b(~i) =
⊗n
l=1 Φbl(il)} on Bob's side in dn
dimensions. The n entangled states Alice sends to Bob
can be considered as an entangled state on (H ⊗H )⊗n
and apparently a successful strategy is the n times exe-
cution of her maximal strategy for the single run {Fx}
obtaining the guessing functions ~x = (x1, . . . , xn). The
resulting vectors of the form η~x =
⊗n
l=1 ηxl we will call
safe product vectors since after rearranging of the tensor
factors
〈η~x |Φˆ~b(~i)〉 =
n∏
l=1
〈ηxl |Φˆbl(il)〉 =
n∏
l=1
δxl(bl),il
they satisfy the constraint (2).
Of course the set of product measurement
bases is no longer non-degenerate, but because
dim(spanR(|Φ~b(~i)〉〈Φ~b(~i)|)) = d2n holds, they still
span the space of all hermitian operators on H ⊗n
and the same is true for the set of all safe product
vectors {η~x}. From the single safe vectors ηx, the safe
product vectors η~x inherit the decomposition property,
by applying the property to one of the tensor factors.
So every safe product vector η~x can be decomposed in
three linearly independent safe product vectors η~u, η~v
and η~w with η~x = η~u + η~v − η~w. From this point the
argumentation for the operator E follows along the same
line as in the single execution case: Firstly for every
two different safe product vectors η~x and η~y we can find
Ψ
Eve
V |Φ~b(~i)〉〈Φ~b(~i)|
Bob
F~x
Alice
~x ~i
E1
HBHA
HBHB
E2
FIG. 1: Full coherent attack on the protocol
a sequence of guessing functions, that via equation (4)
ensure the eigenvalues to be equal. Secondly, since the
span of all safe product vectors generates again H ⊗H ,
which is therefore an eigenspace of the operator E to
one single eigenvalue, E is a multiple of the identity. We
get
Lemma 2. Let {η~x} be the set of all safe product vectors
for the n-times execution of a retrodiction problem with
d + 1 non-degenerate measurement bases {Φb(i)} on a
Hilbert space H of dimension d, for which Alice has a
maximal successful strategy. If E : (H ⊗H )⊗n → (H ⊗
H )⊗n fulfills Eη~x = e~xη~x for all η~x then e = e~x for all
x and E = e1 holds.
We want to analyze the security of the protocol in a
transmission-error free scenario for a full coherent attack
on both quantum channels. That means, that Eve might
eavesdrop on the communication by replacing the trans-
mission line from Alice to Bob by an arbitrary quan-
tum channel U and that her operation V on the feed-
back channel might be connected to the outcome of this
transformation via an additional quantum channel.
As a further generalization we even give the control
of the source of the maximally entangled state to Eve
(see FIG. 1). In this scenario we proof that if Alice and
Bob observe perfect correlations of their data, or, more
precisely, Eve chooses an operation, that does not cause
any errors, the resulting key is perfectly secure.
Lemma 2 shows that the n-time execution of a retro-
diction game can be viewed as a one time execution of
retrodiction game on a larger Hilbert space. Because of
this, we can proof the security of the n times execution
of the single qudit protocol by proving the security of a
protocol where Alice and Bob use a dn dimensional maxi-
mally entangled state initially and the product bases and
measurements defined in Lemma 2.
Now suppose Eve prepares the state Ψ ∈ H ⊗H ⊗
E . Using Um,l = Xmd Z
l
d the elements of the generalized
Pauli-group of a d-dimensional Hilbert space [8], we can
4decompose this state in the maximally entangled basis
on the first two tensor factors and write it as
ΨABE =
∑
m,l,β
pm,lβ(1A ⊗ Um,l ⊗ 1E)|Ω⊗n〉 ⊗ |eβ〉
=
∑
β
(1A ⊗ Uˆβ ⊗ 1E)|Ω⊗n〉 ⊗ |eβ〉
where the operators Um,l have the property to generate
all basis states of the maximally entangled basis if they
are applied in turns to the second tensor factor of |Ω⊗n〉
[9]. For the purpose of clarity these Um,l and the pm,l,β
are absorbed into the Uˆβ . By measuring this state in the
product bases ~b and obtaining the result ~i Bob projects
it onto the state
|Ψ~b,~i〉 =
∑
β
(UˆTβ ⊗ 1B ⊗ 1E)|Φˆ~b(~i)〉 ⊗ |eβ〉.
Here we used that (1 ⊗ Uˆ)|Ω〉 = (UˆT ⊗ 1)|Ω〉 holds for
an Operator Uˆ ∈ B(H ) and the maximally entangled
state |Ω〉 ∈H ⊗H . Eve might implement an arbitrary
quantum channel V acting on her subsystem and the
eigenstate of the measurement Bob is sending back to
Alice. We now analyze the result of this operation:
V [|Ψ~b,~i〉〈Ψ~b,~i|] =∑
β,β′,l
(UˆTβ ⊗ Vl)|Φˆ~b(~i)〉|eβ〉〈Φˆ~b(~i)|〈eβ′ |(UˆTβ′ ⊗ Vl)? ⊗ |el 〉〈el|
(5)
In order to avoid detection, Eve has to restrict her at-
tack to such quantum channels that do not disturb the
measurement statistics observed by Alice and Bob. Even
after Eve has interfered with the quantum systems Alice
should guess the right measurement outcome if no trans-
mission errors are taken into account. This means that
the states received by Alice still respond to the same safe
vectors η~x as before so the condition
tr(|η~x〉〈η~x| trE(V [|Ψ~b,~i〉〈Ψ~b,~i|])) =
n∏
l=1
δxl(bl),il
must be respected for all guessing functions ~x, bases~b and
measurement results ~i. Expanding the Kraus operators
Vl in a standard basis
Vl =
∑
γ,δ,µ,ν
vlγδνµ |γδ〉〈νµ|,
inserting this expression in equation (5) and tracing out
Eve's system we obtain the state controlled by Alice be-
fore her final measurement:
ρA~b,~i =
∑
l,k
Elk|Φˆ~b(~i)〉〈Φˆ~b(~i)|E?lk (6)
where we defined the operators Elk as
Elk =
∑
β
(UˆTβ ⊗ (
∑
γν
vlγkνeβ |γ 〉〈ν|)).
Using (6) we find that the probability to measure one
of the safe product vectors η~x for a given tuple of mea-
surement results ~i in a certain product bases ~b is given
by
p(η~x,~b,~i) = tr(|η~x〉〈η~x|ρA~b,~i) =
∑
l,k
|〈η~x |Elk|Φˆ~b(~i)〉|2.
From the constraint p(η~x,~b,~i) = δ~x(~b),~i we can conclude,
that 〈η~x |Elk|Φˆ~b(~i)〉 has to be valid for every l, k, ~b, ~i
and ~x. The safe product vectors η~x are unique one di-
mensional projectors and Ekl cannot have all the |Φˆ~b(~i)〉
as eigenvectors if Eik 6= γkl1 holds. This leads to the
constraint, that in order to avoid detection, the opera-
tors Elk corresponding to Eve's attack have to fulfill the
eigenvalue equations
E?η~x = γ¯lkxη~x
for all η~x. With Lemma 2 we can conclude, that the
operators are of the form Ekl = γkl1 independent of the
measurement result ~x that Alice obtains.
The state under Eve's control after the transmissions
is given by:
ρEfinal = trAB(V [|Ψ~b,~i〉〈Ψ~b,~i|])
=
∑
l,k,k′
trAB(El,k|Φˆ~b(~i)〉〈Φ~b(~i)|E?l,k′ ⊗ |k〉〈k′| ⊗ |el 〉〈el|
=
∑
l,k,k′
γk,lγ¯k′,l|k〉〈k′| ⊗ |el 〉〈el|
Hence ρEfinal is independent of Bob's choice of bases
~b, his
measurement result ~i and Alice guessing function ~x and
Eve cannot infer any information about the exchanged
key if she wants to stay undetected. This shows the se-
curity of the proposed protocol in a transmission-error
free scenario.
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